Public Philosophy and Political Activity
Chong-Ming Lim
I am attached to the view that some forms of public philosophy are, and should aspire to be, deeply connected with political activity.
Consider the early suffragists who organised and fought to extend the vote to (some) women. Some of these activists engaged in dress reform, and started wearing "bloomers" — pantaloons that they wore under shorter skirts. The change of outfits freed them from the severe physical constraints imposed by their corsets and heavy skirts, which moreover forced their bodies into unnatural but "stylish" shapes. These suffragists were enthusiastic about the freedom that bloomers offered — freedom to move as they pleased. However, they faced immediate and serious opposition. For their audience, this was no mere sartorial decision. The women who donned boomers were regarded as defiant, masculine, tasteless, and exhibiting moral decay, among others. Even many of their closest allies regarded bloomers as an embarrassment and a distraction from the cause (of extending suffrage). It seemed that no one who was of good sense would wear bloomers. In response to the outcry, these suffragists quickly reverted to their original outfits — in order to present themselves, and be regarded as, respectable women.
Few of us, I suspect, make the mistake of regarding these suffragists' choice on this issue as constituting constraints upon subsequent political activity. That is, we don't think — on the basis of this case — that women ought to wear corsets and heavy skirts (or that they ought to dress in certain ways) while protesting, or that they may be dismissed if they didn't dress in these ways. We have not transformed their choice into a criterion for different actors in different contexts, or, worse, into a general moral principle that guides and constrains all actors in all contexts.
We have done less well, however, on another issue. I am, here, referring to our treatment of the actions of some civil rights activists. Specifically, to our regarding some of their choices — made in the face of context-specific moral, political and practical obstacles — as constituting constraints on subsequent political activity. Consider the oft-repeated example of the Greensboro sit-ins. Black activists requested to be served at segregated dining counters, and refused to leave after being denied service. They were moreover generally polite and well-mannered during their protests. Or consider the many peaceful, non-violent marches that some civil rights activists proceeded to engage in throughout the movement. Even today, many of us think that protestors should be restrained, peaceful, and non-violent in exactly these ways. Those who deviate from this script — especially those who take to the streets in anger, who burn police cars, who damage public property, but also those who merely raise their voices or who comport themselves differently — are regarded as behaving badly, and their messages often dismissed. Our enthrallment with these constraints come into sharpest relief when we notice that commentators from both sides of the aisle issue repeated reminders of the ways that some civil rights activists behaved during their protest. The roots of our enthrallment are of course varied. Some regard it as grounded by moral (or at least moralised) principles regulating our interpersonal conduct. Others see it as merely tactical, aimed at maximising the likelihood of an effective campaign. Regardless, the view that these constraints are reasonable or justifiable dominates public and political discourse.
What can public philosophers do here? We can attempt to sever the connection between the behaviour of activists and the content of their message. Breaking the fixation with the former may allow us to appreciate the importance and urgency of the latter. We can demonstrate how the states-of-affairs that activists are responding to, are wicked, unjust, or run against our existing commitments. We can excavate, alongside historians, the reasons undergirding the choices of some of these past activists, showing that they are in response to obstacles that no longer exist or are significantly lessened. Or, if those obstacles still exist, we can argue that they impose undue burdens on activists who seek to build a new world. We can also vindicate the behaviour of activists as fitting, justifiable, or understandable — as being in line with moral principles that we already (or else should) accept. We can reject civility and respectability as constraints on activists. More practically, we can publicly acknowledge the influence that activists have on our thinking. We can provide platforms for activists to speak and disseminate their views. And we can join them in the streets. And to do all these well, we must adopt a view of philosophy that is more capacious than one in which it coolly reflects upon minutiae; we must respect, listen to, and act with, others.
What unifies this non-exhaustive list of tasks? The answer may not lie in their content or methodology, but a particular orientation towards our work and the world. And underlying this orientation is a conviction, among others, that philosophy can be a handmaiden not only to theology or the sciences, but also to emancipatory political activity. Or, as I prefer it, philosophy can be a participant in such activity.
Chong-Ming Lim is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Nanyang Technological University, where he is also co-convenor of the Gender and Diversity research cluster. Prior to this, he was Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Ethics in Society, Stanford University. He completed his DPhil in Philosophy in 2020.
Website: https://www.cmlim.info
